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From Russia With Love:  
Dissidents, Defectors and the Politics 






During the Cold War defectors were invariably paraded as propaganda trophies. The 
wider political significance of defections has hitherto been interrogated almost 
exclusively in an East-West binary. Utilizing recently declassified documents from 
three continents, attention is focused on the elided role played by the developing 
world in the Cold War asylum story and, specifically, that of non-aligned India. By 
reinterpreting international responses to three Soviet defections that occurred in India 
in the 1960s, new light is shed upon political asylum as a source of North-South 
tension and discord.   
 
 
Keywords: Defection; Asylum; India; Cold War; Soviet Union. 
 
 
In January 1968, Suman Mulgaokar, editor of the influential Indian daily, the 
Hindustan Times, published an editorial entitled, ‘The Right of Asylum.’ Mulgaokar 
was an acerbic critic of the ruling Congress Party’s left-leaning socio-economic 
policies and pragmatic approach towards authoritarian Eastern bloc Communist 
regimes. His interest in political asylum was piqued by a series of high-profile 
incidents that saw nationals from behind the Iron Curtain seek refuge in the Indian 
capital’s Western missions. Mulgaokar’s newspaper had, wittingly or not, served as a 
vehicle for the dissemination of Western counterpropaganda designed to weaken 
Communist influence in the subcontinent. Back in 1964, the British Information 
Research Department (IRD), a shadowy covert information arm of the Foreign Office 
with close links to MI6, or the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), recorded with 
satisfaction that the Hindustan Times had, ‘not been inactive on our behalf recently.’1 
Four years later, in noting the consternation that Cold War defections had engendered 
in Indian government circles, Mulgaokar observed wryly that: 
 
To have three Russian defections occur in your country within three years is 
embarrassing enough. When one of the defectors is Stalin's daughter, the matter gets 
much worse. When the third of the defectors…goes about stating that…he had 
‘chosen’ India to defect from because visas for India were relatively easy to obtain, 
the unusually high colour of Indian Home and External Affairs Ministry officials 
becomes easy to understand.2 
 
Less easy to comprehend, in Mulgaokar’s opinion, was an aide memoire that the 
Indian Government circulated to diplomatic missions in New Delhi on 30 December 
1967. Originating in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the note stated that it 
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was, ‘well established that the affording of asylum is not within the purposes of a 
Diplomatic Mission’. Should any Mission receive a request for asylum, the MEA 
directive added, it should be refused.3 The instruction backed Indian officials into an 
awkward corner. Were the American or the Soviet embassies to take in a defector, 
Mulgaokar observed, the MEA faced, ‘the choice of either doing nothing, which 
would make it look impotent, or of invading the Embassy premises which would be a 
violation of the conventions of courtesy between nations.’ In respect of low-level and 
largely benign political refugees, the adoption of such a rigid policy appeared 
unnecessarily punitive and counterproductive. It made little sense in such cases, 
Mulgaokar opined, ‘for India to get into a flap merely because its soil was used to 
stage the defection.’4 
The Indian government’s decision to issue a directive on political asylum was 
triggered by the defection of Aziz Saltimovitch Ulug-Zade, an Indologist at Moscow 
State University. Ulug-Zade had travelled to India as part of a Soviet Komsomol 
group, or political youth delegation. On 19 December 1967, just hours before he was 
due to return home, Ulug-Zade walked out of the Hotel Ranjit in New Delhi, hailed a 
taxi, and made for the British High Commission in the diplomatic enclave of 
Chanakyapuri. Having been turned away by the British, Ulug-Zade moved on the 
American embassy. The Americans proved more welcoming. To the fury of the MEA 
and Soviet diplomats, the US ambassador, Chester Bowles, offered Ulug-Zade 
sanctuary and agreed to assist his defection to the West.5 Diplomatic tensions over the 
Ulug-Zade affair escalated rapidly. In the Indian press, Soviet officials charged their 
American counterparts with kidnapping the young Russian. Finding itself caught in 
the middle of a dispute involving the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, an 
alarmed Indian government saw its relationships with all three countries, and its 
domestic credentials as a safe haven for victims of political persecution, come under 
pressure. Above all, the MEA worried that India’s acquisition of an unwelcome 
reputation as a Cold War clearing-house, or the ‘Berlin of the East’, threatened 
serious harm to the nation’s international relations.6 
In the 1960s, the Indian government was embroiled in a succession of diplomatic 
rows surrounding defections from East to West. Notably, the Ulug-Zade case had 
been preceded a few months earlier by an incident that dominated global news 
headlines. In March 1967, Svetlana Iosigovna Alliluyeva, the only daughter of the 
former Soviet dictator, Joseph Stalin, defected to the United States through India. Five 
years before, in the autumn of 1962, Vladislaw Stepanovich Tarasov, a twenty-five-
year-old Soviet merchant seaman, jumped ship in the eastern Indian port of Kolkata. 
After a protracted legal wrangle in the Indian courts, that saw New Delhi entangled in 
an acrimonious stand-off between Moscow and Washington, the Russian sailor 
departed from the subcontinent to a new life in the West. The Tarasov episode 
occurred at a point when India was reeling from a humiliating military defeat in a 
border war with the People’s Republic of China, and New Delhi was actively courting 
American and Soviet support against Beijing. More broadly, defections staged in 
India served as an unwelcome irritant in relations between the Soviet Union, the 
United States, and Great Britain, when these countries were attempting to defuse 
global tensions and forge more productive ties in the wake of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. The decade between the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, and the Indo-
Pakistan conflict of 1971, witnessed India distance itself from the West, and 
strengthen its relationship with the Soviet Union. In this context, Indian governments 
found themselves scrambling to contain diplomatic fallout from defections staged on 
their soil that threatened to undermine a strategic tilt towards Moscow. 
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India, Non-Alignment and Political Asylum 
 
The significance of nonaligned states and, more specifically, India, in the 
transnational story of Cold War asylum, has been obscured by a tendency on the part 
of historians and producers of popular culture to approach questions surrounding 
defection in an East-West binary. 7  The scant attention given to defections that 
occurred inside the developing world has largely privileged individual narratives, and 
marginalized or ignored the role and agency of Asian and African nations.8 This 
article shifts the prevailing axis of the Cold War asylum debate to examine the impact 
of dissidents and defections from a North-South perspective. It is informed by the 
recent work of Odd Arne Westad, Robert McMahon, and Paul Thomas Chamberlain, 
that reinterprets the Cold War as a global conflict.9 From the early 1950s, ideological 
and socio-political prescriptions for modernity and progress advanced by Washington 
and Moscow were buffeted by local forces across the Global South. To their 
discomfort, the superpowers discovered that the politics of Cold War asylum in India 
required a measure of pragmatism and compromise to be exercised on all sides, and 
not merely on the part of New Delhi. 
Defections placed considerable strain on the policy of Cold War non-alignment 
practiced by states such as India. Of late, scholarship undertaken by Itty Abraham, 
Nataša Mišković, and Christopher Lee, has emphasised how Western neo-
colonialism, and the interventionism of Moscow and Washington, intersected with the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).10 As Lorenz Lüthi has noted, ‘Although the Non-
Aligned Movement tried to transcend the Cold War, its foundation in 1961 was 
triggered, and its first dozen years were shaped, by the superpower conflict.’11 In the 
case of India, the period beginning with the inauguration of the NAM, in Belgrade, at 
the start of the decade, and culminating with the organisations gathering in Algiers, in 
1973, saw New Delhi’s adherence to non-alignment stretched thin and, eventually, 
snap. The policy drivers that lay behind India’s move toward the Soviet orbit during 
this period are manifold. An escalation in tension with the United States over issues as 
diverse as the Vietnam War, food aid, and Bangladesh’s emergence as a nation state, 
all contributed to New Delhi’s decision to effectively abrogate non-alignment, and 
enter into a security pact with the Soviet Union in 1971. Yet, the record of East-West 
defection in the subcontinent during a tumultuous period in its recent history suggests 
that India was as much an active participant in the demise of non-alignment in South 
Asia, as it was a hapless victim.  
This paper reperiodizes the issue of political asylum. To date, a preponderant focus 
has been placed on early Cold War defections, such as those of Guy Burgess, Donald 
Maclean, and Kim Philby, members of the so-called ‘Cambridge Five’ spy ring.12 
Equally, much has been made of espionage activity and political asylum in the later 
Cold War period, when the process of détente faltered, and East-West tensions 
intensified following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in December 1979.13 Yet, 
from the late-1950s onwards, the politics of defection entered a new temporal and 
geographic phase. Defections staged in Europe slowed as border controls between 
East and West Germany were tightened and, in 1961, the Berlin Wall went up. 
Concurrently, applications for political asylum multiplied at points of Cold War 
intersection outside Europe. The numbers of ‘non-returnees’ from Eastern bloc 
delegations visiting Asia increased, and incidents of ‘jumpers’, or absconders, from 
Soviet ships visiting ports across the developing world, grew.14 Before long, such 
shifts in the pattern of defections was mirrored in popular culture. In the early 1970s, 
the novel, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier Spy, penned by the eponymous espionage author, 
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and one-time member of the British secret State, John Le Carrè, situated a Soviet 
defection episode not in the well-worn literary borderlands between East and West 
Germany, but in New Delhi.15  
In a sense, it is understandable that so little attention has been paid within Cold 
War narratives to incidents of defection and political asylum that occurred in the 
context of decolonization. Historical enquiry in this area has traditionally been 
hampered by government secrecy surrounding the processes for identifying would-be 
Cold war defectors, the roles played by intelligence and security services in 
facilitating defection, and state management of publicity and diplomatic blowback in 
asylum cases. In this analysis, to minimise the impact of such restrictions, recently 
released material from state archives in the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
India, has been triangulated with private papers and secondary sources to provide the 
clearest picture yet of the impact of Cold War defection on India’s international 
relations. Specifically, the declassification, early in 2019, of new material from the 
Information Research Department has significantly augmented the existing British 
record covering defection that has been drip-fed to researchers since the 1990s. In 
addition, in the United States, the opening of previously embargoed Cold War records 
by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and within the presidential library system, 
most especially papers held by the Lyndon Johnson and Gerald Ford Libraries, have 
transformed understanding of American responses to prominent political asylum 
cases. Likewise, it is only very recently that important Indian material relating to 
defection and asylum has become available for public consultation at the National 
Archives of  India and the Nehru Museum and Memorial Library, in New Delhi. 
Considerable obstacles remain to scholars attempting to navigate the history of 
Cold War defection in South Asia. Not least, in keeping with the policy of Britain’s 
SIS, India’s intelligence agencies and, above all, the nation’s external intelligence 
service, the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), have kept their organisational 
archives firmly closed. Back in 2004, one leading intelligence historian noted that the 
British government had, ‘fought a long campaign to ensure that much of the history of 
its intelligence services remains secret.’16 The same could be said of the United States 
and India. Nonetheless, while notable records of the covert Cold War in the UK, US, 
and South Asia remain elided, matters have improved considerably over the last two 
decades in terms of state transparency.17 It has now become possible, for the first 
time, to write comprehensive accounts of India’s secret Cold War that are informed 
by official documentation sourced from three continents.18 
Moreover, this paper circumvents limitations imposed by official secrecy to 
recover the importance of hitherto marginalized non-state actors to the global history 
of Cold War defection and political asylum. Inside the Global South, human rights 
activists, lawyers, and journalists, competed alongside and, on occasions, collaborated 
with, the intelligence services and covert propaganda agencies of the Western and the 
Eastern blocs to shape popular attitudes and influence national. For much of the Cold 
War period, the Indian state adopted a proactive, if not altogether successful approach 
to managing the domestic politics of political asylum. Concerned that defections on 
its territory would disrupt India’s relationships with important international partners 
and exacerbate internal fissures, New Delhi was anything but a passive player in the 
high drama of Cold War asylum.  
From a domestic standpoint, when framing approaches to political asylum, Indian 
governments came under sustained pressure from a robust national press, the 
judiciary, and querulous parliaments. Indigenous elements on both the left and the 
right of India’s political spectrum approached the question of asylum as an 
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opportunity to orientate the nation’s foreign policy. In a colonial context, scholars 
elsewhere have stressed the importance of the Indian media to the struggle for 
Independence, and noted British efforts to coopt the subcontinent’s press in a 
counterpropaganda campaign designed to sustain imperial rule.19 Less emphasis has 
been placed on the extent to which Indian perceptions of the press as guardians of 
individual liberties continued to impact national politics in respect of defection and 
asylum after 1947. As will become evident, Western Cold War propagandists worked 
secretly with sympathetic Indian publishers, journalists, and newspaper editors, to 
leverage debates surrounding political asylum in a bid to arrest what policymakers in 
London and Washington saw as an alarming lurch to the left by New Delhi, both at 
home and abroad. 
Moreover, by privileging previously marginalized Indian agency, this paper looks 
to complicate established accounts of the emergence of a human rights dimension of 
international diplomacy. In the case of India, tensions between domestic and 
international considerations surrounding questions of dissidents, political asylum, and 
the application of universal human rights, directly informed policy decisions taken 
from the very foundation of the Indian Republic.20 One legacy of India’s anti-imperial 
struggle, and the oppressive security apparatus employed by the British colonial state 
to frustrate it, was an antipathy towards work performed by intelligence agencies and 
a corresponding emphasis on freedom of expression and individual liberty.21 Indian 
policymakers were confronted by competing demands to evidence a liberal approach 
to political asylum while, at the same time, upholding national security by remaining 
on good terms with both Cold War blocs.  
In attempting to navigate the treacherous waters of Cold War defection, India’s 
leaders were not helped by the persistence of disagreements within the international 
community over the legal and moral obligations of states in respect of political 
asylum. The inviolability of diplomatic premises had been generally accepted by 
European states as far back as the medieval period. The right of missions to grant 
individuals asylum, although not always welcomed by local authorities, was 
invariably upheld. From the early 1950s, however, the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) sought to draw a distinction between diplomatic asylum, or asylum which one 
state grants through a mission located within the territory of another, and territorial 
asylum, or asylum granted within the borders of the state offering sanctuary. 
Controversially, the ICJ concluded that diplomatic asylum had no standing in general 
customary law. Subsequent attempts by the United Nations to codify a universally 
accepted position on political asylum faltered.22 Well into the 1960s, the legal terrain 
surrounding political asylum remained  a matter of dispute. 
Beset by diplomatic exigencies, domestic pressures, and legal ambiguities, Indian 
leaders found it all but impossible to reconcile the domestic and international 
demands imposed by Eastern bloc defections staged in the subcontinent. Such events 
threatened to upset a fragile equilibrium underpinning New Delhi’s relations with 
Washington and Moscow, and represented a headache to policymakers in India, the 
United States, and the Soviet Union. As the Cold War’s battle-lines solidified in 
Europe in the 1960s, and an era of East-West détente got underway, it was in Asia 
that the issue of political asylum coalesced with regional conflicts and domestic 
power struggles to endanger an uneasy accommodation between the superpowers. The 
scandals, uncomfortable parliamentary questions, and press scrutiny of security and 
intelligence activity that habitually accompanied defections staged in Europe in the 




Asylum Central: Becoming the ‘Berlin’ of the East 
 
Western governments took a robust line during the Cold War, in public at least, on the 
moral imperative of extending asylum to political dissidents. Indian administrations 
saw things rather differently. In 1959, confronted by widespread Indian sympathy for 
the plight of Tibetans subject to the imposition of Chinese rule, Jawaharlal Nehru, 
India’s premier, offered asylum to Tibet’s spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, and 
thousands of his supporters, following an abortive insurrection. At the same time, 
India’s Ministry of External Affairs made it clear to the UN Commission on Human 
Rights that the country lacked the economic capacity and infrastructure to 
accommodate further political refugees. Nor, given New Delhi’s commitment to non-
alignment, were Indian policymakers inclined to do so, and run the risk of becoming 
embroiled in arguments between the superpowers. 23  Tensions between India’s 
national security and popular support for a liberal political asylum policy were 
brought sharply home by the Dalai Lama episode. Incensed that India had provided 
Tibetan exiles with a safe haven from which to conduct anti-Chinese activities, and 
suspicious that New Delhi was colluding with the CIA to foment unrest inside Tibet, 
Beijing took a dim view of what it saw as an unwarranted intrusion into its internal 
affairs. 24  In April 1960, having travelled to India for talks with Nehru, China’s 
premier, Zhou Enlai, underlined the extent to which the two states’ differing 
interpretations of political asylum had poisoned bi-lateral relations. Admonishing his 
Indian hosts, Zhou made clear that while Beijing had ‘no objection’ to the principle of 
political asylum, ‘the Dalai Lama is today carrying out anti-Chinese activities and 
encouraging the movement for an independent Tibet. This is beyond the definition of 
political asylum.’25  
Zhou’s protest underscored the broader point made by Indian journalists that had 
equated New Delhi with Berlin, framing the former as a Cold War city, where East 
met West, and espionage and intrigue were endemic. India’s nonalignment did attract 
large diplomatic and commercial missions from both sides of the Iron Curtain. This 
was hardly unique. Other cities inside the non-aligned orbit, and notably Cairo, 
Jakarta, and Belgrade were, at various times, focal points for covert East-West 
competition. The Cold War’s shifting geography, however, guaranteed that India 
would assume an especially prominent role as a clearing-house for defectors. Directly 
to the north of the subcontinent lay the communist colossuses of the Soviet Union and 
the People’s Republic of China. In 1955, an exchange of state visits between Nehru 
and the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, invigorated moribund Indo-Soviet 
relations. Soviet economic and technical assistance to India boomed, while politically 
Moscow courted Indian goodwill by throwing its weight in the UN Security Council 
behind New Delhi’s claim on the disputed state of Kashmir. By the end of Dwight D. 
Eisenhower’s second presidential term, in January 1961, Washington had become 
alarmed by the extension of Soviet influence in India, and the strength of indigenous 
communism in the subcontinent. Eisenhower’s efforts to bring India and the United 
States closer together, primarily through the provision of American economic 
assistance, were amplified by his successor, John F. Kennedy. Kennedy saw 
democratic India as a crucial strategic counterweight to the expansion of communism. 
For a time at the beginning of the sixties, the locus of Washington’s effort to prevent 
Asia turning Red was centered not in South Vietnam or South Korea, but in South 
Asia.26 The neutral political space afforded by Indian non-alignment combined with 
the presence on the ground of thousands of government officials and functionaries 




The Berlin analogy was also symptomatic of the extent to which foreign 
intelligence agencies had come to value India as an operational theatre. The former 
British SIS officer, and Soviet spy, George Blake, observed that alongside Berlin, 
India ranked highly in Western intelligence circles as it offered, ‘the most favourable 
conditions…for establishing contacts with Soviet citizens.’ The presence in India of 
so many diplomats, non-governmental organisations, technicians, businesspeople, and 
journalists from the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States provided ample 
scope for encouraging defections. In New Delhi, Blake underlined, ‘there was a wider 
intercourse than elsewhere between Soviet diplomatic personnel and local politicians 
and public and it would be easier therefore for our [SIS] agents to establish contact 
with them.’27  
What applied to SIS, also held true for the CIA, and Soviet intelligence bodies, 
such as the Committee for State Security (KGB) and GRU, or foreign military 
intelligence. By the 1960s, the CIA had a sizable, growing, and active in-country 
presence in India. Having begun operations from a single ‘station,’ or office, in New 
Delhi, the Agency extended the geographical scope of its activities, establishing a 
network of out-stations in Mumbai, Kolkata, and Chennai. One U.S. diplomat later 
attested that the intelligence footprint in India was, ‘very large, and very invasive . . . 
the CIA was deeply involved in the Indian Government.’28 Indeed, Indian politicians, 
government officials, and intelligence officers had occasion to collaborate with the 
CIA, and other foreign intelligence services, when it suited their interests to do so. 
Specifically, the Indian government elected to ‘look the other way’ as CIA aircraft 
violated its airspace in support of Agency sponsored resistance activities in Chinese 
controlled Tibet. Likewise, New Delhi tacitly approved a CIA-sponsored operation to 
spirit the Dalai Lama out of Lhasa and into northern India.29   
At the same time, a series of young and dynamic KGB chairman, including 
Alexander Shelepin, Vladimir Semichastny, and the future Soviet leader, Yuri 
Andropov, enthusiastically supported Moscow’s policy of fermenting wars of national 
liberation, and undermining Western influence across the Global South. Under 
Andropov’s direction, Soviet foreign intelligence agencies concentrated a large 
proportion of their resources, outside of Europe and North America, on India.30 Oleg 
Kalugin, then a rising star in the KGB’s First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate, 
confirmed that, toward the end of the 1960s, the KGB ‘had scores of sources 
throughout the Indian government – in intelligence, counterintelligence, the defense 
and foreign ministries, and the police. The entire country was seemingly for sale, and 
the KGB and the CIA had deeply penetrated the Indian government.’31  
Within India, public perceptions that defectors were welcome, and would be 
treated sympathetically as victims of political persecution, belied the fact that national 
governments often approached the issue of asylum as an unwanted irritant. Some 
intelligence historians have contended that, ‘encouraging and exploiting 
defection…was a constant component of US policy toward the USSR throughout the 
Cold War.’32 Yet, paradoxically, as Western intelligence services hatched plans to 
stimulate defections, the politicians that they served frequently recoiled from the 
diplomatic tensions such activity fostered.33 A majority of the defectors moving from 
East to West were of limited value in intelligence terms.34 Likewise, the propaganda 
bonanza associated with parading defectors before the world’s media was invariably 
offset in the minds of politicians by the potential such events carried to upset broader 
foreign policy objectives. 
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The mere mention of defection induced neuralgic episodes in British premiers such 
as Winston Churchill and Harold Macmillan.35 In 1954, Churchill expressed alarm 
that the defection of a KGB officer, Nikolai Khokhlov, would undermine that year’s 
Geneva summit, at which Britain, France, China, Russia, and the United States met to 
discuss the fate of Indochina, and the wider Cold War in Asia. Churchill’s ultimately 
abortive plan to exploit the death of Joseph Stalin, which had occurred the previous 
year, and engineer a thaw in the Cold War, led the British prime minister to veto an 
SIS request to publicise Khokhlov’s defection.36 Moreover, a dramatic escape to the 
West that played out at the same time in Australia, and involved Vladimir Petrov, a 
colonel in KGB, provoked a schism in Canberra’s relations with Moscow. Piqued by 
Petrov’s defection, the Soviets waited five years before restoring full diplomatic 
relations with Australia.37 
Although America’s politicians were generally less squeamish about the pitfalls of 
embarrassing Moscow by exploiting defectors for propaganda purposes, US 
President’s did find good cause to rue the politics of political asylum. In 1975, Gerald 
Ford became enmeshed in a damaging domestic controversy involving the Soviet 
dissident, and author of the acclaimed Gulag Archipelago, Alexander Solzhenitsyn. In 
the midst of a period of US-Soviet détente, Ford found himself excoriated by 
Democrats and Republicans for bowing to pressure from Moscow, and refusing to 
meet with Solzhenitsyn.38 In a South Asian context, as we shall see, the politics of 
Cold War asylum meant that Soviet defectors could prove just as unpopular in New 
Delhi, London, or Washington, as they were in Moscow. 
 
Vladislav Tarasov and the ‘Other’ Crisis of Autumn 1962  
 
On the evening of 25 November 1962, global tensions ran high. The superpowers 
were observing an uneasy truce in the immediate aftermath of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. In India, a shell-shocked nation licked its wounds following a humbling 
military defeat at Chinese hands in a short but bloody border war. Amidst a febrile 
international atmosphere, the actions of a young Russian sailor in the subcontinent 
ignited a political storm, setting off a chain of events that placed India at the centre of 
global debates on political asylum. Under cover of darkness, Vladislav Stepanovich 
Tarasov, a young merchant seaman from the Ukraine, climbed out of a porthole on the 
Tchernovtei, a Soviet oil tanker anchored in Kolkata’s King George’s docks, and 
swam to a nearby American ship, the SS Steel Surveyor. Once aboard the American 
vessel, Tarasov, clad only a pair of swimming trunks, announced that his life was in 
danger, and asked the ship’s captain for political asylum.39 
The Soviet defector claimed to have become disenchanted with restrictions on 
personal freedoms behind the Iron Curtain. In a series of public statements crafted by 
America’s Cold War propagandists, Tarasov subsequently proclaimed that after 
listening to Voice of America broadcasts, and reading copies of America, a US 
magazine distributed in the Soviet Union under a cultural exchange agreement, he had 
determined to seek a new life in the United States.40 In fact, the Russian sailor, who 
had a wife and young child back home in the USSR, had a troubled marriage, a 
history of complaining about pay and working conditions in the Soviet merchant fleet, 
and had fallen foul of a political commissar assigned to the Tchernovtei. The 
discovery in Tarasov’s possession of letters critical of the Soviet regime, and an 
accompanying threat from the commissar that the papers would preclude future trips 
abroad, provided the catalyst for an impromptu decision to defect.41 
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In an effort to prevent Tarasov’s flight to the West, V. Londorev, the Soviet consul 
in Kolkata, informed the Indian authorities that the sailor had stolen a small sum of 
money from his ship before disembarking, was a common criminal, and should be 
arrested and extradited to the USSR. Tarasov’s case was the first of its kind in India. 
The Soviets had never previously submitted a request to the Indian authorities for the 
extradition of one of their nationals. On 28 November, after the Soviets, somewhat 
improbably, provided twelve witnesses to Tarasov’s ‘crime’, Indian policemen 
boarded the SS Steel Surveyor and removed the sailor to Kolkata’s central prison.42 
Acting on instructions from Washington, local American officials made clear that the 
United States regarded the Tarasov affair as political matter, that Soviet allegations of 
criminality were demonstrably false, and that the defector should be permitted to seek 
asylum in the West.43  
The Indian government was aghast at being caught in the middle of a Cold War 
dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union at a time when India’s very 
survival appeared to hinge on retaining the support of both superpowers in its conflict 
with China. The New York Times reflected that New Delhi had been thrown into a 
panic by, ‘a Soviet sailor… put[ting] a new strain on India’s embattled policy of non-
alignment in the cold war by demanding asylum...’44 On 29 November, the Kolkata 
daily, Jugantar, or ‘New Era’, noted that ‘…the Government of India, now caught 
between the crossfire of two friendly governments, will not find it easy to take a 
decision on the issue. One of them [an Indian government official] remarked, “now it 
appears that a Sobolev has appeared in Calcutta [Kolkata].’”45 The allusion to Arkady 
Sobolev, a former Soviet ambassador to the United Nations in New York, underlined 
the concern that Indian officials harboured in relation to the Tarasov case. Sobolev 
had been at the centre of a diplomatic furore after he was charged by the US State 
Department with coercing five Russian sailors who had defected to the West into 
returning to the Soviet Union.46 
To the Indian government’s dismay, the Tarasov episode quickly descended into a 
high farce, every twist and turn of which was splashed across the pages of the world’s 
press. Having twice been refused bail by local Indian magistrates, Tarasov, with 
American assistance, took his case to the Indian High Court. On 5 January, as Nehru’s 
government came under intense pressure from both the Soviet and American 
embassies to intervene in the case, Tarasov was released on bail by an Indian judge 
and placed in the custody of Hugh Haight, a local US official.47 Back in Washington, 
the State Department poured scorn on Soviet attempts to portray Tarasov as a criminal 
and to deny that his actions were politically motivated. Referencing previous Soviet 
attempts to pin false legal charges on defectors, a State Department spokesman, 
Lincoln White, defended Tarasov, and reminded journalists pointedly that, ‘we’ve 
heard of such charges [from Moscow] before.’48 Indeed, in concert with colleagues in 
the IRD, American officials actively sought to leverage the world’s media to secure 
Tarasov’s defection. One IRD officer noted that the seaman’s enforced return to the 
Soviet Union, ‘would, inter alia, discourage other defections. We assume that 
TARASOV has useful information. It would appear that the best available means of 
accomplishing our objective is through international publicity.’49 
To Moscow’s consternation, the Soviet case against Tarasov was compromised 
after embarrassed Russian officials discovered that a criminal act committed within 
Indian territorial waters did not constitute legal grounds for extradition. An Indian 
Extradition Act had passed through the country’s parliament a few months previously, 
but it remained pending ratification when Tarasov sought asylum. In an exchange of 
diplomatic notes between Indian and Soviet officials in November and December, the 
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MEA provided the Russians with a copy of the Extradition Act and, more 
significantly, indicated the precise evidence that an Indian magistrate would expect to 
see before approving a request for repatriation.50  By coaching the Soviets in the 
intricacies of Indian asylum law, the MEA created the impression of having sacrificed 
its impartiality in the pursuit of national security. Legal advice offered by the MEA to 
the Soviets was later decried by Indian jurists as tantamount to ‘providing the 
Russians with a ready-made machine for achieving their object.’51 On 10 January 
1963, a Kolkata court dismissed the Soviet extradition motion against Tarasov. 
Emerging from the court a free man, Tarasov, in full view of a large contingent of 
international reporters, was immediately rearrested by the Indian authorities on the 
basis of fresh evidence provided by the Soviet embassy. Contrary to previous witness 
statements, and in line with the MEA’s counsel, the Soviets now claimed that the 
alleged theft committed by Tarasov had, in fact, occurred on the high seas.52 The 
extradition case, which by now had assumed the appearance of a cause célèbre in the 
subcontinent’s media, returned to India’s courts.  
In the background, local Soviet officials impressed upon the MEA the imperative 
of concluding legal proceedings swiftly, and before international press coverage of 
Tarasov’s case compromised New Delhi’s relations with Moscow. Apprehensive 
American diplomats confided to British colleagues that the Indian government was, 
‘under heavy Soviet pressure to hand him [Tarasov] back and may in fact do so.’ The 
MEA had, the Americans suspected, ‘probably imposed press censorship which 
would explain [an] absence of further reports on the subject.’ In the circumstances, 
the Americans ensured that Indian officials were ‘clear that they [the US] will 
promote widespread publicity for the case if Tarasov is returned [to the Soviets].’53 
One Indian stringer for the London Daily Express, Prakash Chandra, added weight to 
the notion that New Delhi was actively obstructing journalist’s efforts to publicise the 
Tarasov case. Chandra advised British contacts that, ‘he and several other 
correspondents have been trying to file this story [on Tarasov] since early December 
but have been frustrated by censorship.’ The New York Times’ correspondent in India, 
Tom Brady, who had managed to circumvent the media embargo and report on the 
defection saga, was threatened with deportation by the Indian government.54 
To the MEA’s irritation, as the ponderous wheels of Indian justice ground slowly 
on, IRD officers worked closely with American colleagues to stimulate media 
coverage of the Tarasov case. During early January, the IRD reassured US officials 
that Reuters and the BBC had both been drafted to shine a spotlight on Tarasov’s 
plight. Inside the subcontinent, British propagandists quietly channeled information 
on the Soviet defector to the Indian press. The IRD’s undercover officer in New 
Delhi, Peter Joy, informed Whitehall that a number of Indian newspapers, including 
the Kolkata Current, had ‘made good use of our [IRD] material.’55 ‘Press publicity 
[in] this case is progressively increasing,’ the IRD noted with satisfaction and, with 
British encouragement, was primed to expand further unless New Delhi changed 
course and facilitated Tarasov’s passage to the West.56 At one point, the IRD tipped 
off the local press that Anton Fedoseev, cultural attaché of the Soviet embassy, and 
someone who had played a prominent part in the extradition case, was an officer in 
the GRU.57 
By the end of February, in an effort to bring the Tarasov episode to a close, the 
Indian government appointed a special magistrate, N. L. Bakkar, to oversee the case. 
Its denouement played out in a small, dingy court room in New Delhi, close to the 
national parliament. After a month of additional testimony, and four long months 
since Tarasov had jumped ship, Bakkar confounded expectations, and dismissed all 
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charges leveled by the Soviets against the defector, who was promptly spirited out of 
the country by American officials. In delivering a damning verdict, Bakkar 
undoubtedly went further in condemning Soviet actions than his own government 
would have wished. Soviet officials, the magistrate concluded, had ‘manufactured 
evidence’ against Tarasov, had failed to produce credible witnesses, and had 
concocted a case that was ‘wholly inadequate and rife with contradictions’.58 The 
disgruntled Soviets immediately lodged an appeal against Bakkar’s ruling. Curiously, 
the appeal was heard by Chief Justice Donald Falshaw, a former British colonial 
official who had stayed on in the subcontinent following Indian independence. What 
faith, if any, the Soviets retained in British administered Indian justice remains 
unclear. Falshaw dismissed the Soviet appeal in under an hour, and reaffirmed 
Tarasov’s right of asylum.59 
To the Indian government’s discomfort, the domestic and global media represented 
the outcome of the Tarasov affair as a zero-sum game, which the Soviets had lost. On 
30 March, Prem Bhatia, the influential and anglophile Indian civil servant-turned-
journalist, pronounced in the Guardian that ‘a cold war ended today between the 
Russian and American Embassies over a Russian who wanted to live in the West. The 
Americans seem to have won.’60 Two days later, Kolkata’s Statesman, a newspaper 
that enjoyed a reputation for fiercely independent reporting and outspoken criticism of 
illiberal government policies, roundly condemned ‘Socialist legality’ in an editorial 
entitled ‘The Ways of Justice’. The Tarasov case had, the newspaper informed its 
readership, accentuated fundamental differences between India’s appreciation of 
individual freedoms and the absence of rights and justice behind the Iron Curtain, ‘a 
grim reality of which there have been many reminders in recent years.’61 The doyen 
of the national press, the Times of India, which was generally more accommodating of 
Indian governments, went further still, declaring that the ‘shocking features’ of the 
Tarasov case suggested that ‘even after Mr. Khrushchev’s much publicised de-
Stalinisation campaign… the Soviet authorities are still not able to distinguish 
between prosecution and persecution.’ Taking a thinly veiled swipe at the MEA, 
India’s oldest daily suggested that satisfaction at Tarasov’s acquittal, ‘will be shared 
by all who believe that justice is not a matter than can be subordinated to political 
expediency.’62  
Western policymakers harboured a deep anxiety at the scale and impact of 
communist propaganda carried by the India press.63 Frequent complaints were voiced 
to Indian governments by London and Washington over the pernicious political 
influence wielded by a string of Moscow-sponsored Indian publications, such as Blitz, 
Patriot, Link, Mainstream, and New Age.64 In the Tarasov case, however, Western 
propagandists, such as the IRD, proved equally willing and adept at working through, 
and often in concert with, sympathetic sections of the Indian media to leverage the 
issue of Cold War asylum and undermine Communism inside and outside the 
subcontinent. If anything, the Tarasov episode offers evidence of a capacity of the 
part of India’s judiciary, and mainstream press, to resist the imposition of political 
pressure and assert their independence. To the MEA’s chagrin, subsequent efforts by 
Indian governments to insulate their relations with the Soviet Union from the impact 
of Cold War defections would prove to be equally ineffectual in the face of 






‘The most sensational defector that the United States has ever attracted’: 
Svetlana Stalin heads West   
 
As the 1960s progressed, the challenges that incidents of Cold War asylum presented 
to the Indian government multiplied. Notably, the defection of Svetlana Alliluyeva in 
New Delhi, in March 1967, sparked a diplomatic uproar that tested India’s relations 
with the West and the Soviet Union. Barely a year earlier, Lal Bahadur Shastri, who 
had assumed the Indian premiership on Nehru’s death, in May 1964, suffered a fatal 
heart attack in the Soviet city of Tashkent. Shastri had been in the USSR to sign a 
Moscow-sponsored peace treaty with Pakistan, following an outbreak of Indo-
Pakistani hostilities. Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi, was subsequently co-opted by 
Congress Party leaders to serve as India’s third prime minister. In New Delhi, 
troubled British officials soon began referring to the emergence of a ‘Gandhi factor’ 
in India’s international relations. More precisely, India’s leader was suspected of 
having acquired a considerable ‘chip on the shoulder’ when it came to the West. 
Under the direction of the left-leaning Gandhi, India’s diplomatic, economic, and 
military ties with the Soviet Union flourished. Dispirited by diminishing Western 
influence in India, John Freeman, Britain’s High Commissioner, advocated, ‘leav[ing] 
it to the Russians to make the running [in India], in the hope of gradually recovering 
our [Western] influence and eventually making a comeback later.’65  
Shifts in India’s political landscape provided a strong incentive for Gandhi to tack 
to the left, and build bridges with Communists, both foreign and domestic. Popular 
discontent with economic mismanagement by successive Congress governments that 
manifested in failures to tackle rampant corruption, youth unemployment, and food 
shortages, weakened Gandhi’s grip on power. 66  National elections, held at the 
beginning of 1967, saw the Indian leader’s parliamentary majority slashed. In the 
states of Bengal in eastern India, and Kerala, in the west of the country, electorates 
returned communist governments. Unease over Gandhi’s leadership festered amongst 
conservative elements within her own party, and prompted a political rupture in the 
Congress that left the Indian premier reliant on support from the Moscow-sponsored 
wing of the Communist Party of India (CPI). For much of the next two decades, the 
‘world’s largest democracy’ was to be governed by a leader predisposed, both 
personally and politically, to exhibiting a marked circumspection in dealing with 
Britain and the United States. In the context of the covert Cold War this, as one 
former CIA officer recalled sardonically, meant that ‘CIA agents . . . were to be found 
according to Madame Gandhi, beneath every charpoy and behind every neem tree.’67 
It was against this backdrop, that the Alliluyeva drama unfolded early in the 
evening of 6 March. Taking advantage of the distraction provided by two receptions 
inside the Russian embassy, one of which, appropriately enough, was celebrating 
Soviet ‘Women’s Day’, a neatly dressed woman carrying a small suitcase slipped 
quietly into the streets of India’s capital. Her destination was the United States’ 
chancery building. On arrival, speaking in good but heavily accented English, 
Alliluyeva informed the marine guard on duty that she was a Russian citizen, and 
wished to see an embassy officer. Having been shown to the office of the US deputy 
chief of mission, Svetlana Alliluyeva confirmed to stunned American officials that she 
was the daughter of Joseph Stalin, and his second wife, Nadezhda Alliluyeva.68 As the 
London Economist observed, Alliluyeva was nothing less than ‘the most sensational 
defector that the United States has ever attracted.’ Reflecting on the conundrum that 
Stalin’s daughter had presented to the American, Soviet, and Indian governments, the 
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Economist added presciently that Alliluyeva constituted a surprise package that ‘is 
plainly marked “Handle with care”’.69 
Alliluyeva was the common law wife of an Indian communist, Brajesh Singh, who 
she met while working at a publishing house in Moscow. She had travelled to India 
following Singh’s death to scatter his ashes into the river Ganges. Claiming to have 
become disillusioned with communism, Alliluyeva asked the Soviet ambassador, Ivan 
Benediktov, for leave to remain in India. The request was refused and, under orders to 
return to home, Alliluyeva decided to defect. Reasoning that it would be only a matter 
of hours before the Soviets discovered that Alliluyeva was missing, America’s 
ambassador, Chester Bowles, sent a flash cable to Washington. In it, the ambassador 
informed the State Department that ‘unless advised to the contrary’ he would place 
Alliluyeva on a commercial flight leaving New Delhi for Rome later that evening. 
Having previously served as Under Secretary of State in Washington, Bowles 
experience told him, correctly, as it transpired, that the Washington bureaucracy was 
unlikely to react with sufficient speed to countermand his decision. Shortly after 
midnight, Alliluyeva was issued with an American B-2 tourist visa, bundled into an 
embassy car, and driven to Palam airport in the company of a CIA officer, Robert 
Rayle. Following a moment of high tension when her flight was delayed for ninety 
minutes due to a mechanical fault, at 2.45 am, on 7 March, Svetlana Alliluyeva 
departed from India and flew into political exile. 
Bowles decision to facilitate Alliluyeva’s defection was motivated by several 
factors. Denying her assistance and directing Alliluyeva back to the Soviet embassy 
was rejected by the ambassador as, ‘completely contrary to our [US] national 
tradition.’ The option of exfiltrating Stalin’s daughter from India was deemed to 
involve, ‘unacceptable and unnecessary risks.’ It was preferable, Bowles concluded, 
to openly and legally put Alliluyeva on a commercial flight to the West.70 The fact 
that Alliluyeva’s Soviet and Indian documentation was in order, and that she could be 
demonstrated to have departed from India of her own volition, provided some 
protection against charges ‘of another CIA plot and against the accusation of 
kidnapping her [Alliluyeva] against her will.’ Moreover, the ambassador rationalized 
that were it to become known that the American government had turned its back on, 
‘an appeal for assistance from the daughter of Joseph Stalin, the public outcry in the 
United States and elsewhere would have been overwhelming.’ Equally, given the 
legal uncertainty surrounding political asylum, keeping Alliluyeva inside the US 
embassy compound risked provoking a prolonged and unwelcome diplomatic 
standoff.71 
Early optimism voiced by Bowles that his embassy had successfully pulled off a 
‘ticklish’ operation, proved to be premature.72 On 8 March, India’s foreign secretary, 
Chandra Shekhar (C. S.) Jha, informed the ambassador that the Soviet Embassy was 
‘extremely upset’ and had ‘stated to Indian officials that American secret agents 
abducted her [Alliluyeva] from India by force.’73  Coming in the wake of recent 
failures in the Soviet Soyuz space programme, Alliluyeva’s defection threatened to 
tarnish Moscow’s long-planned celebrations to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Soviet revolution. One Indian newspaper noted that thousands of books, stage plays, 
exhibitions, lectures, and press articles were already ‘being churned out in an 
unending stream by the official [Soviet] propaganda machine.’74 The Soviets made 
clear their displeasure with Bowles by breaking off all contact with US officials in 
India. A moment of light relief amidst the diplomatic turmoil occurred a week after 
Alliluyeva departure, when Bowles bumped into Benediktov at a social function. The 
scowling Soviet ambassador taunted Bowles by asking if anyone calling at his 
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embassy would be issued with a visa and a ticket to America? Quick as a shot, a 
smiling Bowles replied, ‘For you, we will.’ At which point, Benediktov dissolved into 
fits of laughter. 75 
The Indian government continued to be much less amused by Alliluyeva’s 
defection. On 9 March, the MEA served the US embassy with a formal note of 
protest. The note complained that Bowles’s decision to act, ‘in such haste, without 
giving any inkling to the Ministry of such impending action, is a source of serious 
embarrassment to the Government of India in their relations with the Soviet Union 
and the United States.’ The MEA expressed particular concern that the Alliluyeva 
affair could adversely impact the ‘close and friendly relations with the Soviet Union’ 
that the Indian government ‘greatly value’. Ending with a flourish of indignation, the 
Indian government’s admonition underlined that it could not but, ‘regret this action of 
the US Embassy which may put in jeopardy relations between India and the Soviet 
Union and may have serious repercussions on Indo-US relations.’76 
Bowles was sufficiently disturbed by the MEA’s strident tone to fire off a 
mollifying letter to Jha. In his palliative, the ambassador disclosed that Alliluyeva had 
threatened to take her case to the world’s press and appeal directly to the people of 
India and the United States were her request for asylum denied. In the circumstances, 
the ambassador suggested, he had been left with little choice but, ‘to give her a visa to 
the United States and help her on her way.’ Attempting to turn the tables on his Indian 
hosts, Bowles presented his action as motivated primarily by a desire, ‘to avoid 
putting the Indian government in an embarrassing position’ and prevent India, the 
United States, and the Soviet Union from becoming embroiled in ‘a legalistic and 
contentious public controversy.’ Bowles also hinted that India’s role in the Alliluyeva 
story was more complicated than publicly acknowledged. Specifically, the 
ambassador stated that Alliluyeva, whose deceased husband’s nephew, Dinesh Singh, 
was minister for state at the MEA, claimed to have approached the Indian government 
for asylum. Dinesh Singh and colleagues at the MEA had, Alliluyeva informed the 
US embassy, indicated that India would take no action on the matter of asylum that 
ran contrary to the wishes of the USSR. Far better given this state of affairs, Bowles 
volunteered, for the Indian government to have been presented with a fait accompli by 
the Americans.77 
It was not only the Indians that were keen to keep the Soviets on side. The State 
Department, too, had no desire to see such a high-profile defection dislocate wider 
US-Soviet relations. The importance of securing Soviet goodwill on matters ranging 
from Vietnam and the Middle East, to arms control and consular conventions, ranked 
far higher on President Lyndon Johnson’s list of priorities than Soviet apostates, no 
matter how prominent. Undersecretary of State Foy Kohler, who had served a term as 
America’s ambassador to the USSR, and was committed to engineering a thaw in US-
Soviet relations, reacted with fury to the news of Alliluyeva’s defection. ‘Tell them 
[Bowles’ staff] to throw that woman out of the embassy,’ Kohler had raged, ‘Don’t 
give her any help at all.’78 In an effort to remove some of the political heat from the 
Alliluyeva affair by denying it the oxygen of publicity, the Johnson administration 
offered little public comment. The British were advised by American colleagues that 
the defection was, ‘being handled very restrictively indeed within the [Johnson] 
Administration and that only three to four people in the State Department and White 
House are au courant.’79 In New Delhi, the US embassy was, ‘instructed not to talk to 
people about the [Alliluyeva] episode.’80  
Encouragingly for Washington, signals coming out of the Soviet Union indicated 
that Moscow was equally keen to downplay events. On 21 March, in a meeting with 
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Indian diplomats, the Soviet deputy foreign minister, Nikolay Firyubin, adopted a 
‘relatively mild’ attitude to Alliluyeva’s defection, at one stage making light of the 
fact that, by neglecting to confiscate Alliluyeva’s passport, Benediktov had 
unwittingly facilitated her defection. Relieved Indian officials indicated to American 
colleagues that the differences between Benediktov’s aggressive response to the 
Alliluyeva affair, and Firyubin’s more relaxed reaction, appeared reflective of the 
Soviet ambassador’s personal insecurities rather than official Soviet thinking.81 Such 
thinking appeared justified when, in April, Benediktov was demoted and transferred 
to Yugoslavia.  
Nevertheless, the Soviets did indicate to the American embassy in Moscow that 
their forbearance would last only so long as the United States continued to display 
sensitivity to the embarrassing position in which the USSR had been placed by 
Alliluyeva’s actions. Notably, a KGB officer warned American counterparts that were 
Alliluyeva granted permanent asylum in the US, as opposed to another Western 
country, the Soviet intelligence agency would conduct a disinformation campaign, 
complete with forged documents, detailing how the CIA had coerced Stalin’s 
daughter into defecting.82 With Indian officials also maintaining a stony public silence 
on Alliluyeva, ‘except to announce that India had nothing to do [with her defection]’, 
it appeared that a dangerous diplomatic squall might blow over.  
Events back in in the United States, however, cast a spotlight on the activities of 
the CIA that, in turn, reignited concern in India over the Agency’s role in the 
Alliluyeva affair. Specifically, the American west-coast magazine, Ramparts, 
published an exposé detailing the CIA’s secret financial relationships with a number 
of international educational institutions and cultural bodies, some of which operated 
in the subcontinent. British officials in India rued that the Alliluyeva episode had 
coalesced with the Ramparts story to spark, ‘a renewal of public interest in the actual 
and conjectural activities of the C.I.A. in India.’ In the Lok Sabha, India’s lower 
house of parliament, Communist MP’s accused government ministers of being on 
CIA’s payroll. In response, Congress parliamentarians levelled counter-allegations 
that members of the Opposition had been unwitting recipients of CIA funds.83 In the 
midst of a maelstrom of suspicion, rumour, and paranoia surrounding the CIA, 
Bowles was summoned to the MEA to account for a fresh accusation that the Agency 
had orchestrated Alliluyeva’s defection. The Soviet embassy, Indian officials 
informed Bowles, claimed to have received, ‘information from U.S. sources that there 
had been correspondence between U.S. and Indian officials and that this had indicated 
there was some kind of Indo-American complicity [in Alliluyeva’s defection].’ An 
indignant Bowles rebutted the Soviet charge. Whether the US had, or had not, enticed 
Alliluyeva to defect, dispirited MEA officers responded, was a moot point. The Soviet 
embassy, the American ambassador was informed, ‘simply cannot believe that Indian 
officials did not know that Svetlana was leaving when she did. They have therefore 
convinced themselves of Indian duplicity.’84  
Speculating on a hardening in Moscow’s attitude to Alliluyeva’s defection, Triloki 
Nath Kaul, secretary at the Ministry of External Affairs, suggested that that Soviet 
premier, Alexei Kosygin, had come under scrutiny in the Kremlin for his role in 
Alliluyeva’s flight. At the time, Kosygin was in the midst of a power struggle with 
rivals in the Soviet leadership, including the general secretary of the communist party, 
Leonid Brezhnev, and chairman of the presidium, Nikolai Podgorny. It had been 
Kosygin, Kaul noted who ‘had personally permitted Svetlana to come to India against 
the advice of some other members of the politburo.’85 To its consternation, the Indian 
government found itself at the centre of a tussle between competing factions within 
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the Soviet government. Some in the politburo and Soviet foreign ministry, such as 
Firyubin, sought to play down India’s role in the Alliluyeva incident. Other Soviet 
officials, most notably Benediktov and Kosygin, had good reason to do precisely the 
opposite. Complaining that it was ‘absurd’ for the Soviets to persist in ‘accusing the 
Indian government of having worked in cahoots with United States Embassy’, the 
MEA nonetheless came under ‘heavy’ pressure to act on purported US interference in 
India’s internal affairs.86 
Toward the end of March, the Soviet charges of Indo-US complicity in the 
Alliluyeva case began to strain Indian patience. With celebrations to mark the 
twentieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and 
the USSR looming, British officials observed a lack of mutual ‘sympathy’ between 
Moscow and New Delhi. One Indian diplomat confided to British colleagues that he 
had been treated ‘very frigidly’ on a recent visit to the Soviet capital as a consequence 
of the Alliluyeva incident. 87  Meanwhile, Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet foreign 
minister, adopted an unusually firm line with Indian interlocuters on the sensitive 
issue of nuclear non-proliferation.88 Calling the Soviet deputy chief mission, Smirnov, 
into the MEA, R. Jaipal, India’s joint secretary for external affairs, reiterated testily 
that the Indian government had provided Moscow with an official undertaking that it 
had played no part in Alliluyeva’s defection. Should the Soviet government persist in 
discounting India’s assurances, Jaipal stated curtly, there would no longer ‘be [a] 
proper basis for the development of future relations between the two countries.’ 
Appraised of his encounter with Smirnov by an exercised Jaipal, Bowles advised 
Washington that, ‘It is clear that Indians are starting to get their dander up over 
continued Soviet pressure.’89 
Back in Whitehall, Sir Paul Gore-Booth, permanent under-secretary of state at the 
Foreign Office, hatched plans to exploit the Alliluyeva defection. Gore-Booth praised 
the manner in which American colleagues had taken the ‘very wise step of not giving 
the defection what might be called “routine exploitation”’ and unduly ruffling Soviet 
feathers. However, the veteran diplomat, who served as British High Commissioner in 
India in the early 1960s, suggested that there were ‘ways in which, so to speak, the 
free countries should “exploit this non-exploitation”’. Arguing that the Alliluyeva 
defection ‘was of quite a different order’ from anything the West had seen in recent 
memory, Gore-Booth underscored that it had been rationalised in humanitarian rather 
than ideological terms. By encouraging and amplifying press comment that echoed 
Alliuyeva’s emphasis on Soviet constraints upon individual liberties, the inequities of 
the communist system could be illuminated without London being accused of crude 
political point scoring. ‘This [universal human rights] may not be a new doctrine,’ 
Gore-Booth reasoned, ‘but its relaunching by the daughter of Stalin, in the fiftieth 
year of the Communist Revolution in Russia, is immensely important.’90 
The Foreign Office quickly set about putting Gore-Booth’s idea into action. 
Whitehall’s strategy was to stimulate its contacts in the press ‘not to play this 
[Alliluyeva’s defection] as a cold-war operation’, but to stress the ‘absence of 
personal and cultural freedom’ in the Soviet Union that Stalin’s daughter had 
referenced as fundamental to her decision to defect. Alliluyeva had, the Foreign 
Office noted, criticised Moscow’s decisions to proscribe Boris Pasternak’s novel, 
Doctor Zhivago, and to sentence the writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel to 
hard labour for publishing satirical works critical of the Soviet regime.91 In India, the 
IRD worked covertly with one of its contacts, Gopal Mittal, owner of the National 
Academy Publishing House in New Delhi, to issue an article entitled, ‘Unending 
Soviet War on Intellectuals.’ Reproduced across northern India in English, Urdu, 
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Hindi, and Punjabi editions, the article observed that by persecuting its intellectuals 
and assaulting fundamental human rights, Moscow was ‘slapping public opinion, at 
home and abroad, in the face.’92 Meanwhile, the Sunday Times, which intended to 
serialise an autobiographical manuscript that Alliluyeva had persuaded T. N. Kaul to 
smuggle out of Moscow, were encouraged by British officials to keep the story alive 
and on the newspapers front pages.93 Commentators in the press speculated that the 
Kremlin would ‘undoubtedly’ be worried by the impact that an illicitly distributed 
book written by Alliluyeva would have inside the Soviet Union. The effect, one 
Indian journalist suggested, could be ‘comparable to Khrushchev’s “secret speech”’, 
the publication of which by the US State Department in 1956 had helped to ferment 
unrest in Poland and Hungary, and contributed to ‘other political troubles which beset 
the Soviet empire.’94  
Utilising Alliluyeva to throw the Soviets off-balance appealed to the IRD. In 
September 1967, a proposal from the department to have Shirley Williams, the 
minister of state for education and science, review Alliluyeva’ memoir on the flagship 
BBC Radio 4 programme, Women’s Hour, was rejected by the Foreign Office 
‘because of the extreme sensitivity of Soviet Government on this matter.’95 The IRD 
had more success in selling the merits of unattributable propagandising, or activity 
that could not easily be traced back to Whitehall. Through its covert network in India, 
the IRD arranged to distribute copies of Alliluyeva’s book, Only One Year, to 
sympathetic Indian politicians and journalists. The book, which America’s 
propaganda agents in South Asia had declined to circulate for fear of antagonising 
Moscow, was, IRD officers crowed, ‘practically unobtainable in India...as the Indians, 
at Soviet insistence…were holding up imports.’96  Although more active than the 
American government in working behind the scenes to keep media interest in 
Alliluyeva alive, the British congratulated themselves on remaining largely under the 
Soviet radar, and avoiding Moscow’s ire. 
In contrast, in the United States, the Johnson administration faced welcome press 
scrutiny for its handling of the Alliluyeva case. In an article entitled, ‘‘Svetlana Lost 
or Found?’, the conservative National Review chided Johnson for ignoring the fact 
that, ‘…Svetlana Alliluyeva is playing out a momentous role in history...[while 
Washington had decreed that] Svetlana's defection must be neutralized, drained of its 
large historical meaning…so that the image of an increasingly benign Communist 
Russia may be permitted to stand undisturbed.’97 At the same time, the Soviet press 
lambasted ‘ruling-circles’ in Washington for indulging in ‘provocations of the highest 
level’ that were designed to derail Soviet-American détente.98 A succession of press 
conferences, media interviews, and public appearances made by Alliluyeva in the 
United States, coupled with the revelation that a tell-all memoir would shortly be 
rolling off American presses, shattered Soviet complacency that an accommodation 
could be reached with the US government to minimise political fallout from the 
defection. The fact that George Kennan, a former US ambassador to the Soviet Union, 
whom Stalin had declared persona non grata, and who had provided the intellectual 
rationale for the policy of Cold War containment, was known to be assisting 
Alliluyeva with her book, did little to assuage Moscow’s sense of American bad faith. 
On 27 May, Pravda accused the CIA and United States Information Service of 
exploiting ‘the Svetlana affair…[to orchestrate] a massive anti-Soviet propaganda 
campaign.’ ‘In short,’ the official newspaper of the Soviet communist party declared, 




In an ironic twist, after two decades living in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, Alliluyeva eventually returned to Russia. In late 1984, the year in which 
year George Orwell had set his dystopian vision of a future totalitarian state, Svetlana 
Stalin came home. Anticipating a dose of their own propaganda medicine, one 
Western commentator, who had known Alliluyeva well, observed ruefully that, 
‘Naturally, she’ll be expected and indeed required [in the Soviet Union] to make 
violently abusive attacks on America and Britain.’100 The game of Cold War asylum, 
it seemed, had turned full circle. In more immediate terms, the Svetlana Alliluyeva 
affair had a profound influence on the manner in which the Indian government 
approached the defection of another Soviet citizen, Aziz Saltimovitch Ulug-Zade, in 
December 1967. With the political fallout from Alliluyeva’s decision to use New 
Delhi as a staging-post to the West still reverberating through the corridors of India’s 
Ministry of External Affairs, Indira Gandhi’s government adopted a heavy-handed, 
legalistic, and ultimately ineffective response to the increasingly vexing issue of 
political asylum. In the process, the Indian government drew censure from domestic 
critics, and embittered its relations with the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
the Soviet Union. 
 
 ‘To have three Russian defections occur in your country within three years is 
embarrassing…’: Ulug-Zade and the Containment of Cold War Asylum  
 
On 21 December 1967, with newsprint barely dry on the acres of paper that India’s 
press had devoted to Svetlana Alliliuyev’s defection, New Delhi was greeted by a raft 
of unwelcome and sensationalist headlines in the wake of Aziz Ulug-Zade’s 
disappearance. The Times of India’s front-page pronounced dramatically, ‘Soviet 
youth vanishes in Delhi and causes Diplomatic sensation.’ The MEA, the leading 
Indian daily reported, had taken a ‘very serious view of this incident, since it does not 
want India to be turned into a cold war arena by the Big Powers in their game of 
international espionage and psychological warfare.’ Moreover, Indian government 
officials were said to be concerned that, coming just eight months after the Alliluyeva 
episode, Ulug-Zade’s defection would have ‘wider political repercussions’ for Indo-
Soviet relations.101 Revealingly, the Soviet press made no mention of the Ulug-Zade 
case. From Moscow, Indian diplomats reported that the Soviet foreign ministry had 
maintained an icy silence on the matter. Instead, the Soviet ambassador in New Delhi 
was employed to exert maximum pressure on the Indian government to see that the 
latest defection incident was dealt with quickly, quietly, and to Moscow’s 
satisfaction.102 
The Soviet embassy’s immediate reaction to Ulug-Zade’s flight reinforced Indian 
anxieties that Russian tolerance on the issue of political asylum had been exhausted. 
Nikolai Pegov, the Soviet ambassador, stormed into the MEA and demanded that the 
youth leader be returned to his custody. Having rescinded Ulug-Zade’s passport, 
Soviet officials informed Indian, American, and British counterparts that it would be 
considered an unfriendly act were they to facilitate his defection to the West. Under 
Soviet pressure, the MEA instructed Delhi’s police to find Ulug-Zade, and to ensure 
that he remained in India until the facts surrounding his disappearance could be 
established. However, as Indian journalists were quick to point out, the extent to 
which their government could satisfy Soviet demands in respect of Ulug-Zade were 
limited. Under Indian law, and in accordance with international conventions on 
asylum, New Delhi had no authority to compel the defector to return to the Soviet 
Union. Having entered the country legally on a visa issued by the Indian embassy in 
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Moscow, and following the cancellation of his Soviet passport, Gandhi’s government 
was empowered only to deport Ulug-Zade to a country of his choosing.103 
Soviet indignation at the latest defection to take place in India was magnified by a 
familiar suspicion that the CIA may have been behind the Ulug-Zade affair. Eastern 
bloc diplomats in New Delhi confided to Indian officials that Moscow suspected the 
US intelligence agency of getting even for the recent defection of an American 
citizen, John Discoe Smith. Before seeking political asylum behind the Iron Curtain, 
Smith had served as a communications clerk in the US embassy in Delhi. The Soviets 
subsequently arranged for a communist publishing house in India to release a 
salacious account of purported CIA misdeeds in South Asia, under Smith’s name.104 
Moreover, as the Indian Embassy in Moscow underlined to the MEA, in using the 
Smith ‘revelations’ to attack Indian right-wing politicians, Soviet propagandists over 
reached themselves and alienated Indian opinion. ‘There was quite a lot of resentment 
in India of critical references of the broadcasts of the [Soviet] “Radio Peace and 
Progress” and the publication in the [Moscow] Literary Gazette of John Smith’s 
article in which some distinguished Indian leaders were maligned,’ Indian diplomats 
in the Soviet capital reported. ‘It was explained to Soviet officials in Moscow that 
such partisan articles by Soviet publicity media were bound to affect relations 
between the two countries.’105  
Allegations of CIA interference in India’s internal affairs had featured prominently 
in the Indian national elections that spring, and had been amplified by the Agency’s 
association with Alliluyeva’s defection. Consequently, fresh rumours of American 
intelligence involvement in the Ulug-Zade case were politically explosive, and spread 
panic inside the Indian government.106 Moreover, from an Indian perspective, other 
worrying echoes of the Alliluyeva case emerged. Specifically, the international press 
began to insinuate that Ulug-Zade had been motivated to leave the Soviet Union by a 
denial of freedom of expression, constraints imposed on fundamental human rights, 
and the ‘treatment of Soviet writers and intellectuals.’ The Russian defector, one 
newspaper emphasized pointedly, was the son of a well-known Uzbek poet.107 
In part, the diplomatic frenzy sparked by the Ulug-Zade affair explains the decision 
taken by John Freeman to turn the Soviet teacher away when he came calling on the 
evening of 19 December. London’s relations with India remained tense following a 
spat between Harold Wilson’s government and New Delhi during the Indo-Pakistan 
war of 1965. Consequently, Freeman baulked at taking in the Soviet defector and 
risking the Gandhi administration’s ire. Any thoughts that Freeman may have 
entertained about offering Ulug-Zade sanctuary were further complicated by the 
intervention of Nikolai Pegov. Having been alerted by companions of Ulug-Zade that 
he might seek sanctuary at the UK High Commission, the Soviet ambassador 
contacted Freeman directly and made clear that Moscow would react strongly were 
the British mission to harbour a Soviet citizen.108 To add to Freeman’s problems, his 
communication links back to London were temporarily compromised. At the time, 
Stella Rimington, a future director-general of the British Security Service, MI5, was 
working as an assistant to the Service’s resident Security Liaison Officer (SLO) in 
India. Rimington recalled how, with a defector standing on their doorstep, the SLO 
was unable to locate the duty cypher clerk and dispatch a request to London for 
instructions. It later transpired that, anticipating a quiet night at work, the cypher clerk 
had slipped off to be with a Sikh boyfriend, and ignored repeated telephone calls and 
frantic knocks on her door.109  
Isolated and under pressure to act, Freeman turned to colleagues at the American 
embassy for advice. Although wary that the United States might be subject to a Soviet 
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deception exercise designed to compromise Washington’s relations with New Delhi, 
Chester Bowles agreed to take-in Oulug-Zade while enquires were made as to his 
bona fides. One senior US embassy official later recalled that, ‘the British ducked and 
he [Oulug-Zade] wound up as a houseguest in the American Embassy residential 
compound... We wanted to be more forthcoming than the British so we granted him 
asylum while we debated [what to do].’110 Alarmed that Chester Bowles might act 
precipitately, as in the case of Alliluyeva, the MEA sought an assurance from the US 
embassy that Oulug-Zade would ‘not be whisked out of the country without its 
knowledge.’ Having been stung by political fallout from the Alliluyeva affair, the last 
thing that the Johnson administration wanted was a second defection crisis on its 
hands. Accordingly, Galen Stone, senior counsellor at the US embassy, was quick to 
reassure Indian government officials that Washington would ensure every ‘effort was 
made to find a way out of this tangle without undue embarrassment to either side.’111 
A solution to the Oulug-Zade conundrum arrived from an unexpected quarter. The 
British, having previously spurned Oulug-Zade request from asylum, abruptly 
reversed course, and indicated that they were, after all, prepared to offer sanctuary to 
the Soviet citizen. Toward the end of December, Freeman formally advised the MEA 
that the British government had received, and accepted, an application for political 
asylum from Oulug-Zade.112 It remains uncertain what prompted London’s volte-face. 
Short of engineering Oulug-Zade’s return to the USSR, averting the media spectacle 
of a second Soviet defector transiting from the subcontinent to the United States 
within the same year would certainly have been agreeable to Moscow and New Delhi. 
Oulug-Zade had previously expressed a preference for relocating to the United 
Kingdom, and had made the British High Commission his first port of call after 
deciding to defect. The British reversal was, therefore, able to be couched in 
humanitarian terms. Whatever the reason, it seems likely that some form of deal was 
struck between Bowles, Freeman, Pegov and the MEA to recast the Oulug-Zade issue 
as something other than a direct confrontation between the US and Soviet 
superpowers. The effect, as undoubtedly intended, was to remove much of the 
political pungency from the defection. 
That is not to say that the end-game of the latest Soviet defection in India passed 
off without incident. As frustrated officials inside the MEA worked to bring the 
Oulug-Zade case to a satisfactory conclusion, opponents of Gandhi’s administration 
once again sought to score political points from the country’s latest defection drama. 
On 22 December, during a three-hour foreign affairs debate in the Lok Sabha, Gandhi 
was repeatedly thrown on the defensive. Minocher Rustom ‘Minoo’ Masani, a leading 
figure in the conservative Swatantra Party, baited the Indian premier over her 
government’s failure to confirm that Oulug-Zade would be allowed full freedom to 
determine his own destiny. Linking the Oulug-Zade case to a recent agreement 
reached by the Indian government with the Soviet news agency, Novosti, which had 
ties to Russia’s intelligence services, Masani lambasted Gandhi’s tendency to ‘lean 
over backwards to please the Soviet Government.’113 In addition, Masani arranged for 
an open letter of support for Oulug-Zade to be signed by prominent Indian figures, 
including Koka Subba Rao, a former Chief Justice of India, and G. L. Mehta, one-
time Indian ambassador to the United States. The letter appealed to India’s prime 
minister, ‘on the grounds of fundamental human rights embodied in our Constitution 
and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which India is a signatory to 
allow Aziz [Oulug-Zade] to go to the United Kingdom without further delay and in 
accordance with his choice.’ Asserting that it would be a ‘disgrace’ to India were the 
Soviet defector coerced into returning home, the document warned Gandhi’s 
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government against ‘injur[ing] India’s international prestige’ by succumbing to 
pressure from Moscow.114 
The question of how best to exploit Indian criticisms of the Gandhi government’s 
position on Oulug-Zade occupied the attention of Western propagandists and, not 
least, those working within the IRD. The department debated passing unattributable 
material to Indian contacts in the press that highlighted growing political dissent 
amongst Soviet youth, noted resistance to Moscow’s rule within the Soviet Central 
Asian Republics, and repackaged elements of the Tarasov and Svetlana defections. In 
some quarters of the British intelligence community, Oulug-Zade’s intellectual 
credentials apeared to offer up an excellent opportunity for publicising the suffocating 
cultural constraints imposed by the Soviet regime on its citizens. A senior officer of 
the British Security Service subsequently categorised Oulog-Zade as, ‘a man of great 
intelligence – in fact the most intelligent defector with whom he had ever had 
contact.’ It was Ulugzade’s [sic] intellectual penetration,’ MI5 concluded, ‘which had 
made him no longer content to endure the various shame imposed on him in the 
Soviet Union and so led him to defect.’115 
In an Indian context, further efforts to capitalise on the theme of Soviet persecution 
of writers and intellectuals was, however, dismissed as unwise on two grounds. 
Firstly, bringing additional pressure to bear on Gandhi and her ministers, it was 
reasoned, risked damaging delicate bilateral relations and making the Oulug-Zade 
imbroglio ‘harder to solve’ by ‘provoking those inside and outside the [Indian] 
Government who stand to lose most by Oulug-Zade’s unwavering preference for 
Britain.’ Secondly, Indians were doing an excellent job by themselves of holding their 
government to account. ‘As you will doubtless have noticed from the [local] press 
coverage,’ the resident IRD office informed London, ‘the facts of the case have been 
sufficient both to provide a condemnation of Communism and to place the Indian 
authorities in a position where they would risk compromising themselves and their 
democratic freedoms if they had refused to accede to Oulug-Zade’s wish [to resettle 
in the UK].’116 In the circumstances, the IRD was content to bide its time and delay 
public exploitation of Oulug-Zade’s defection until after the Soviet national had 
departed from the subcontinent.117 As the chairman of the British Joint Intelligence 
Committee reasoned, while ‘it would be quite normal for Mr. Ulugzade [sic] to give 
modest publicity to his experience…we would not want to mount an operation on his 
behalf. He is not our answer to Philby… & the K.G.B.’118 
Indeed, as 1967 drew to a close, Indira Gandhi and her government remained under 
sustained pressure from domestic political opponents determined to characterise the 
Indian government’s ‘equivocal attitude’ to the issue of political asylum as a 
fundamental ‘breach of human rights.’ On 27 December, addressing a press 
conference convened under the auspices of the Indian Committee for Cultural 
Freedom and the Indian Group of the Liberal International, Masani accused the MEA 
of inhumane and illegal behaviour in seeking to deny Oulug-Zade a ‘sanctified right’ 
to asylum in the West. The ministry of external affairs, the Indian MP imputed, ‘was 
acting illegally to please the Soviet Government.’119 Attacks from the Indian right 
rattled Gandhi’s administration which, with limited success, attempted to recast the 
issue of political asylum as a problem of the United States’ making. Government 
allies in the Communist Party warned the Indian public that Washington was utilising 
Soviet defectors to destabilise New Delhi’s relations with Moscow. Meanwhile some 
of Gandhi’s own MPs, such as Arjun Arora, lamented that as a consequence of 
American machinations, ‘India was becoming a Cold War arena’. The time had come, 
Arora stated bluntly, to put an end to foreign powers abusing India’s goodwill, and 
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using the country to score cheap propaganda points at the expense of India’s wider 
political and economic interests.120 
The Oulug-Zade affair touched an especially sensitive nerve inside the MEA. As 
one Indian newspaper noted, the country’s diplomats resented ‘allow[ing] Indian soil 
to be used for cold war propaganda and thereby embarrass itself in its relations with 
other friendly [Eastern bloc] countries.’121 However, as Indian lawyers deputised to 
advise Oulug-Zade made perfectly clear, the MEA could expect legal challenges were 
attempts made to return the defectors to the Soviet Union. Referencing the Tarasov 
case back at the beginning of the decade, Gandhi’s government was reminded that the 
State had come off badly when the issue of defectors rights had last been placed 
before the judiciary.122 Still, angered by what it regarded as an abuse of freedoms 
prevailing in India by three Soviet defectors over the previous five-years, the MEA 
notified diplomatic and consular missions in the country that it did not accept their 
right to grant asylum. ‘The Government of India do not recognize the right 
of…Missions to give asylum to any person or persons within their premises,’ a 
directive drafted by the MEA’s Legal and Nationality department stated bluntly. 
Insisting that it was ‘well established international practice’ that ‘the affording of 
asylum is not within the purposes of a Diplomatic Mission’, foreign diplomats were 
told not to grant, ‘any request for asylum, or temporary shelter, or refuge.’123 
In a private discussion with Freeman, Kaul went further, and confirmed that New 
Delhi was examining existing legislation with a view to making the sheltering of 
defectors an offence under Indian law.124  British and American officials in India 
concluded that the MEA’s threat was unenforceable, and ignored the trial balloon. In 
London and Washington, analysts concurred that ‘the main purpose of the Indian 
circular was to discourage other would-be defectors from using India as their take-off 
point.’ The terms of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, it was 
noted, legitimized asylum on humanitarian grounds. Accordingly, British diplomats in 
New Delhi were instructed, ‘not in any way concede to the Indian authorities that 
asylum may not be granted on this ground.’ Although ‘anxious to promote friendly 
relations’ with India, and ‘willing to accommodate the Indian Government as far as 
possible’, the British stopped short of publicly qualifying their support for Cold War 
asylum.125 Following the State Department’s lead, and after ‘a considerable amount of 
inter-departmental consultation’, Whitehall disregarded the MEA’s approach.126  In 
fact, as Indira Gandhi was forced to concede on 14 February during a debate in the 
Lok Sabha, the MEA failed to receive a single formal reply to its circular on asylum 
from any foreign mission in New Delhi.127 In response to the noise generated by the 
Indian government on political asylum, the international diplomatic community 




Recovering the history of political asylum within the hitherto elided context of the 
developing world illuminates the extent to which leading non-aligned states, such as 
India, were compelled to assume prominent roles in the high drama of defection as the 
Cold War spread outwards from Europe and into Africa and Asia. Significantly, the 
Indian government’s engagement with the thorny diplomatic problem posed by 
political asylum exposed the existence of deep fault-lines between Indian domestic 
sentiment, which broadly favoured a liberal and compassionate policy on asylum, and 
New Delhi’s conviction that the nation’s wider interests were best served by an 
uncompromising and legalistic response to political refugees originating from the 
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Eastern bloc. Indian officials invariably found themselves squeezed by seemingly 
contradictory demands to defend New Delhi’s post-independence commitments to 
freedom of political expression, individual liberty, and universal human rights while, 
simultaneously, pursuing national security interests that hinged on the maintenance of 
constructive relationships with the superpowers. 
For the remainder of the Cold War, Soviet military and economic ties to India held 
firm, in part as a consequence of crisis in Indo-US relations occasioned by the Nixon 
administration’s tilt to Pakistan during the East Pakistan/Bangladesh crisis of 1971. 
At the time, one of Indira Gandhi’s closest foreign policy advisors, P. N. Haksar, 
informed the Indian premier, ‘I personally believe that our relations with the Soviet 
Union are of cardinal importance and they are going to acquire increasing importance 
in the years to come.’128 The use of India by Eastern bloc defectors as a convenient 
route to the West continued, however, to inject tension into bilateral relations between 
India and the Soviet Union. In February 1970, a year prior to the conclusion of an 
Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, a fourth Soviet citizen, Youri 
Bezemenov, slipped quietly out of the Indian capital and into political exile. An 
official posted to the USSR’s Information Centre, Bezemenov had, appropriately 
enough, spent his last evening in the subcontinent watching an American film in a 
Connaught Place cinema, before disappearing into the Indian night.129 By 1972, the 
Times of India had become almost blasé in reporting the latest Soviet national to 
abscond on Indian soil. Informing its readership that Mr. A. V. Tereshkov, a Russian 
engineer working at the Bokaro steel plant, in the east of the country, had disappeared 
with his family, the Times reflected ruefully that a nationwide alert and stringent 
checks placed on airports and border posts had failed to turn up the Russians. ‘It is 
believed’, the newspaper added, ‘that they [the Tereshkov family] had already left 
India with the help of a foreign mission.’130 
Indian domestic politics, however, ensured that the issue of political asylum 
remained a choleric component of North-South dialogue. In June 1975, having come 
under investigation for electoral malpractice, and with protestors having taken to 
India’s streets in almost equal numbers both to support and denounce her government, 
Indira Gandhi declared a national state of emergency, suspended civil liberties, 
censured the press, and jailed political opponents. The large-scale and arbitrary 
detention of opposition politicians and activists prompted Amnesty International to 
categorise the Indian government’s action as, ‘perhaps the most significant event of 
the year in terms of human rights in Asia.’131 The British and American governments 
found themselves inundated with applications for political asylum from Indian critics 
of Gandhi’s government who had managed to evade arrest. In turn, the sympathetic 
line taken in London and Washington to requests from Indian citizens for political 
asylum garnered New Delhi disapprobation.132  
Considerable scholarship has been expended on interrogating defection in an East-
West framework, but more expansive geo-political considerations of the issue remain 
opaque and are much less well understood. If the Indian government’s campaign to 
inhibit Cold War defections in the subcontinent did not yield tangible results in the 
long 1960s, it nevertheless represented a significant event. The MEA’s involvement 
provides evidence of a democratic government reinterpreting international law to suit 
diplomatic exigencies; and, taken together with recent disclosures of ubiquitous and 
active covert foreign intelligence operations in India, it reinforces the scale of the 
Cold War’s impact on South Asia. Furthermore, the episode also enhances 
understanding of how Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and India 
approached political asylum in a non-European context. Not least, the considerable 
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costs that Indian governments confronted in respect of East-West defections, both in 
domestic political terms and in the context of broader national security, can be seen to 
have contributed to the emergence within Indira Gandhi’s government of a conviction 
that non-alignment had come to outlive its utility as an instrument of international 
relations.  
The transformation of India’s capital city into an Asian Berlin at the height of the 
Cold War was always going to be problematic for a nascent non-aligned nation 
burdened with a colonial history of political oppression and human rights abuses. 
Striving to balance national security concerns against prevailing domestic sentiment 
resulted in a measure of hedging and obfuscation on the part of Indian governments. 
Once enmeshed in the politics of Cold War asylum, New Delhi sought to actively 
discourage and disrupt defections on Indian soil while, at the same time, working 
assiduously to minimise any adverse impact on its relationship with Moscow. In the 
process, Indian officials floundered in the face of competing local pressures, domestic 
political rivalries, and diplomatic exigencies. The politics of Cold War asylum 
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